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We've Been Screaming About IT. Now it Happened
Google's shiny new Antigravity AI code editor got pwned. Hard.
PromptArmor just published a devastating indirect prompt injection attack that makes Antigravity steal your credentials, bypass its own security settings, and exfiltrate everything to an attacker-controlled domain.
Here's how it goes:
- User asks Antigravity to help integrate Oracle ERP's new AI Payer Agents feature
- Antigravity reads a poisoned "implementation guide" found online
- Hidden prompt injection (in 1pt font!) tells Gemini to:
- Scrape credentials from
.env files
- Bypass its own gitignore protections using
cat terminal commands
- Build a malicious URL with your AWS keys URL-encoded as query parameters
- Spawn a browser subagent to visit the attacker-monitored URL
And the absolute kicker? The default URL allowlist includes webhook.site literally a domain designed for logging arbitrary HTTP requests.
Game over. Your AWS credentials are now in an attacker's webhook logs.
That makes a weaponized agentic AI with:
- Terminal command execution
- Browser automation tools
- Default configs that assume you'll "actively supervise" every agent action
Spoiler: You won't. That's literally why they built the Agent Manager interface to run multiple agents simultaneously in the background without constant human oversight.
Google addressed this with A disclaimer... ...
A warning screen during onboarding that says "don't operate on sensitive data" and "review every action."
"Given that the Agent Manager allows multiple agents to run without active supervision, we find it extremely implausible that users will review every agent action." — PromptArmor Research Team
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